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What are the constitutional norms for self-interpretation-that is, the
constitutional rules governing whether and when a government body has the
power to issue controlling interpretations of legal texts that it drafted? The
answer to this question could determine the fate of Seminole Rock deference,
the nearly seventy-year-old doctrine enabling agencies to issue controlling
interpretations of their own regulations. Jurists and scholars have argued that
the doctrine runs afoul of a constitutional norm against self-interpretation, and
last term Chief Justice Roberts asked future litigants to brief whether the court
should overturn the doctrine on this basis. This Article is the first to
comprehensively examine constitutional self-interpretation norms by looking at
the conditions under which the heads of the three branches of government
exercise self-interpretation powers. It shows that self-interpretation is
pervasive and that the Supreme Court would be wrong to overturn Seminole
Rock on self-interpretation grounds. Moreover, by examining self-
interpretation practices, this Article brings new insight to the many areas of
law that involve self-interpretation, including presidential oversight of
agencies andjudicial stare decisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What are the constitutional norms for self-interpretation-that is, the
constitutional rules governing whether and when a government body has the
power to issue controlling interpretations of legal texts that it drafted? The
answer to this question, which is the focus of this Article, has high stakes. It
could determine the fate of one of the most-cited administrative law doctrines,
Seminole Rock deference.'
I Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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In 1945, the Supreme Court held in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 2
that courts must treat agency interpretations of their own regulations as
controlling unless they are "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."3 In effect, this landmark case allows agencies to self-interpret
regulations. The doctrine went largely undisturbed until 1996, when Professor
John Manning published an influential article arguing that our constitutional
structure abhors self-interpretation, seeing as how it separates law-making and
law-interpreting functions into different branches of government.4 Because
Seminole Rock deference violates this apparent norm against self-interpretation,
Manning recommended that the Court invalidate the doctrine.5 Manning's
argument eventually influenced Justice Scalia, who in 2011 flipped from being
for Seminole Rock to being against it in large part because of this anti-self-
interpretation norm.6 Justice Scalia, in turn, has influenced Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, who recently signaled their desire for future parties to
brief whether the Court should overturn Seminole Rock. In the 2013 case
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,7 Scalia voted to overturn
the doctrine because it "violate[s] a fundamental principle of separation of
powers-that the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest
in the same hands."8 Because none of the parties had briefed the issue, Roberts
was not prepared to vote against the doctrine, but Roberts, joined by Alito,
wrote separately to note: "Questions of Seminole Rock ... deference arise as a
matter of course on a regular basis. The bar is now aware that there is some
2 Id
3Id. at 414.
4 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 654 (1996). Other important
academic treatments of the doctrine include: Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A
Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 49, 112 (2000) (defending Seminole Rock deference as necessary to make Chevron
deference meaningful); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1307-09 (2007) (discussing when Seminole
Rock applies); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study ofJudicial Review
ofAgency Interpretations ofAgency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 516 (2011) (finding that,
when the Supreme Court applies Seminole Rock, the agency wins 91% of the time); Kevin
M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 412 (2012) (arguing that courts
should apply Seminole Rock deference when the agency's interpretation is consistent with
the regulation's purpose); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole
Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1466 (2011) (developing a taxonomy of
considerations that courts can use to assess when to apply Seminole Rock deference).
5 Manning, supra note 4, at 617.
6 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265-66 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Manning's article and noting that, "while I have in the past uncritically
accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity").
7 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).81d. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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interest in reconsidering those cases, and has available to it a concise statement
of the arguments on one side of the issue."9
Because of Roberts's plea, it is likely that briefs will soon be filed in federal
court arguing that Seminole Rock deference should be overturned because it
violates a constitutional norm against self-interpretation.10 Eventually, it is
likely that the Supreme Court will reconsider its correct assumptions about what
our constitutional structure has to say about the conditions under which self-
interpretation is and is not permissible. No one has yet taken an exhaustive look
at this issue. Manning's article focused only on the general rule against self-
interpretation by Congress. He did not address exceptions to this rule and did
not focus on self-interpretation by the other branches of government."
This Article examines the conditions under which the heads of the three
branches of government have self-interpretation powers. I show that, far from
being abhorrent to our constitutional system, self-interpretation is a pervasive
feature of it. The commingling of law-making and law-interpreting power in a
single body has its risks, most commonly that the body will draft unduly vague
laws that provide little notice and then fill in gaps later with interpretations as it
sees fit. However, under many conditions, these risks are outweighed by other
institutional values. Moreover, these risks are often mitigated by procedural and
structural mechanisms that help check the potential abuse of a self-
interpretation power.12
The Article's concrete normative payoff is to show that the Supreme Court
would be wrong to overturn Seminole Rock. There is no robust anti-self-
interpretation norm that favors the result, and the opponents of Seminole Rock
simply have not shown that the doctrine's institutional justifications are
outweighed by the costs from allowing agency self-interpretation.' 3
By examining self-interpretation practices, this Article also brings new
insights to the many areas of public law that involve self-interpretation,
including presidential oversight of agency decision-making and judicial stare
decisis, among others. On agency oversight, this Article shows that, after
Presidents issue directives to agencies, they often have the power to self-
interpret these orders to ensure agency compliance. 14 This power of self-
interpretation gives Presidents an advantage over Congress, which can issue
statutory orders to agencies but cannot self-interpret those orders. This finding
adds to the literature showing that the office of the presidency comes with an
9 1d. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
10 See Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, Judicial Agenda Setting Through Signaling and
Strategic Litigant Responses, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 215, 217 (2009) (showing that
"Supreme Court Justices shape the Court's agenda by providing signals to litigants about the
sort of cases they would like to see, and litigants consider those signals when deciding
whether or not to pursue a given case").
1 ISee Manning, supra note 4.
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part LH.B.
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array of tools for overseeing agencies that Congress lacks.' 5 This Article also
adds to the literature on how stare decisis affects judicial behavior by explaining
how the self-interpretation feature of stare decisis can encourage the Supreme
Court to craft vague rules that the Court will self-interpret later.16
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides the necessary factual
background for the debate over Seminole Rock by discussing its justifications
and critiques, highlighting Manning and Scalia's anti-self-interpretation
critique. Part III comprehensively describes the many conditions under which
the heads of the three branches of government exercise self-interpretation
powers and the justifications for such institutional designs. Throughout this
Part, implications for several other areas of law are discussed as well. Part IV
applies the findings in Part III to the normative debate over Seminole Rock and
concludes that the Court should not dismantle the nearly seventy-year-old
doctrine because of concerns about self-interpretation. Part V concludes.
II. SEMTNOLE ROCK DEFERENCE: ITS JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUES
This Part explains how Seminole Rock establishes agencies as the primary
interpreters of their own regulations and examines the justifications and
critiques for the doctrine. Section A describes the scope and content of Seminole
Rock deference. Section B discusses the rationales for Seminole Rock deference.
Sections C and D discuss potential problems with Seminole Rock deference.
Section C discusses past concerns that Seminole Rock deference enables
agencies to issue controlling regulatory interpretations without fair notice and
how a 2012 Supreme Court case largely blunted these concerns. Section D is
the heart of this Part. It explains the essential details and assumptions of the
most important attack against Seminole Rock deference, which I will refer to as
the anti-self-interpretation critique.
A. Seminole Rock's Holding and Scope
This Section briefly discusses the major cases on Seminole Rock deference,
which establish that courts must accept agency interpretations of their own
regulations unless: the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation; the regulation merely paraphrases or parrots the underlying
statute; or the interpretation was announced without fair notice to the regulated
entities.
The case of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. involved a dispute over a
Depression-era regulation by the Office of Price Administration (OPA), which
had implemented a general price freeze by providing that sellers of goods could
not charge more for an item than the highest price the seller had charged for that
15 See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245
(2001).
16 See infra Part III.C.
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class of item in March 1942.17 The Seminole Rock and Sand Company had
delivered crushed rock for 60 cents per ton in March 1942, but at the time it also
had a contract to deliver crushed rock for $1.50 per ton at a future date. 18 The
legal issue was whether the 60 cents or $1.50 per ton was the highest amount
the company could charge under the regulation.19 The OPA interpreted its own
regulation to mean that sellers were bound by the highest price based on actual
deliveries in March 1942 and not based on future contractual obligations, thus
Seminole Rock could only sell its rock for 60 cents.20 The district court, in
denying the agency's request for an injunction, appeared to give little or no
weight to the agency's interpretation.21 However, the Supreme Court sided with
the agency and established that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation
"becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." 22 This holding established agencies as the primary
interpreters of their own regulations because, when a range of reasonable
interpretations exist, the agencies and not the courts choose which one governs.
Cases involving agency interpretations of their own regulations routinely
land on the Court's docket, and the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Seminole
Rock deference in the nearly seventy years since it was established, most
famously in the 1997 case Auer v. Robbins.23 Although Auer did not tread new
ground, it has gained significant attention among courts as the modern
reaffirmation of Seminole Rock deference, and commentators now alternate
between referring to Seminole Rock deference and Auer deference as the
doctrine that establishes strong judicial deference to agency interpretations of
their own regulations. 24
Despite the repeated reaffirmation of Seminole Rock, two recent cases have
narrowed the doctrine's domain. In the 2006 case Gonzalez v. Oregon,25 the
Supreme Court established the anti-parroting principle, which holds that
Seminole Rock deference does not apply to agency regulatory interpretations
when the underlying regulation parrots or paraphrases the enabling statute. 26 To
receive deference, the agency's regulation must significantly clarify or narrow
the scope of the statute. As the Court explained: "An agency does not acquire
special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise




21 Id. at 412-13.
22 Id. at 414.
23 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
24 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (referring to the doctrine as both Seminole Rock deference and Auer deference).
25 546 U.S. 243 (2006).26 1d at 257; see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,
584-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that agencies are not free "to promulgate mush and then
give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal 'interpretations,"' but concluding
that the principle did not apply to the particular case).
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and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the
statutory language." 27
The Supreme Court narrowed the doctrine's domain further in the 2012
case Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,28 which established that
Seminole Rock deference does not apply when the agency's regulatory
interpretation creates an "unfair surprise" for the regulated industry. 29 The
question in Christopher was whether pharmaceutical representatives are
"outside salesmen," a category of employee that is not entitled to overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 30 For decades, pharmaceutical companies
had interpreted the relevant Department of Labor regulations as treating their
pharmaceutical representatives as exempt outside salesmen. During that time,
the department never initiated an enforcement action or otherwise suggested
that it took a contrary position.31 Nevertheless, when the issue of whether
pharmaceutical representatives are outside salesmen eventually arose in
litigation between employers and employees, the agency submitted amicus
briefs that interpreted its regulation to mean that pharmaceutical representatives
would not qualify as exempt outside salesmen. 32 If the Supreme Court had
accepted this interpretation, the companies could have been on the hook for
large sums in overtime and back pay.33 However, the Supreme Court did not
defer to the department's interpretation because doing so would create an
"unfair surprise" and "seriously undermine the principle that agencies should
provide regulated parties 'fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or
requires."' 34 The Christopher Court did not undermine the basic thrust of
Seminole Rock, but it established that deference is not appropriate when the
agency's interpretation lacks fair notice.
B. The Rationales for Seminole Rock
Many of the modem justifications for and critiques of Seminole Rock
deference are derived from comparisons to its far more famous relative,
Chevron deference.35 This Section briefly discusses the Chevron doctrine and
shows how its key rationales of expertise and accountability also support
Seminole Rock. It then discusses the distinct rationale that Seminole Rock
deference improves interpretive outcomes because it affords interpretive
primacy to the actors with the most insight into the regulation's original intent.
2 7 Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 257.
28 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).29 Id at 2167.30 1d at 2161.
3 1 Id. at 2168.32 Id at 2169.
33 Id at 2164.
34 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Conun'n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
35 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2014] 299
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Under Chevron deference, agencies' reasonable interpretations of their
enabling statutes are controlling if those statutes are ambiguous. 36 This
deference establishes agencies as the primary interpreters of their own statutes
because, when there are a range of reasonable interpretations, the agencies and
not the courts choose which of these interpretations govern. 37 Some jurists and
theorists ground Chevron deference in a presumption that, when Congress
delegates ambiguous authority to agencies, Congress prefers that the agencies
and not the courts resolve the ambiguity.38 This presumption of congressional
intent is based on agencies' superior expertise and accountability. 39 As the
Supreme Court said when it established Chevron deference: "Judges are not
experts in the [agency's] field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government." 40
Courts have used similar language to support Seminole Rock deference. For
example, the Second Circuit has explained: "Like the deference owed
under [Chevron] to an agency's reasonable construction of a statute it
administers, Seminole Rock deference is justified both by the agency's special
expertise in the subject matter . .. and by its relative political accountability." 41
Aside from expertise and accountability, Seminole Rock deference may
produce interpretive outcomes that are more in line with the regulation's
original intent. Discovering the original intent of legal text has long been the
cornerstone of legal interpretation, especially statutory interpretation. The
Supreme Court has said that discovering the original intent of the legislator is
the "sole task" before the Court in a statutory interpretation case.42 The leading
modern schools of statutory interpretation also emphasize the search for original
intent.43 Extending this original intent approach to regulatory interpretation
36 1d. at 843-44.
37 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 969-70 (1992) ("[R]ead for all it is worth, [Chevron] would make administrative actors
the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of
enforcing unambiguous statutory terms."); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 127 (1994).
38 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.11 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001).
39 See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.
676, 689 (2007) (noting that the presumption of congressional intent is a fiction based on
institutional advantages of agency decision-making).4 0 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
41 Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners, 464 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2006). Because of
the similarities between Chevron deference and Seminole Rock deference, commentators
often consider the two doctrines to apply the same deferential level of review to agency
actions. See, e.g., David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 144 n.25 (2010).
4 2 Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984).
4 3 See WLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-14
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324 (1990).
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supports Seminole Rock deference.44 The drafting agency is in the best position
to have insight into the original intent of a regulation because it wrote the
regulation. Seminole Rock deference recognizes this fact by treating agencies
and not courts as the primary interpreters of agency regulations.
The Supreme Court has endorsed this originalist rationale for Seminole
Rock, explaining that Seminole Rock deference is based in part on the agency's
superior ability to "reconstruct the purpose of the regulations" it drafted.45 The
Court has similarly noted that Seminole Rock deference "is strongly supported
by the fact that [the agency] wrote the regulation." 46
One potential weakness of the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock is that
it may not justify judicial deference when agencies interpret regulations that
were enacted years in the past because an agency will have less insight into the
original intent of an old regulation. 47 However, the mere passage of time does
not defeat the originalist rationale, which is based on comparative institutional
competencies that remain relatively constant over time. Even when years have
passed since the drafting of the relevant regulation, agency officials will have a
greater link to the original drafting of the regulation than courts will. If we
reasonably assume that some amount of institutional knowledge is passed down
from one generation of agency officials to the next, then agencies have a greater
claim to understanding the original intent of a regulation than courts do.48
C. Seminole Rock Deference's Fair Notice Problem
Although Chevron and Seminole Rock share some rationales, there is an
important procedural difference between the two. Agencies generally receive
Chevron deference only when their interpretations are made through formal
procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which agencies publish
proposals of their rules and solicit and respond to public comments before
44 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 4, at 1454.
4 5 Martin v. Occupational & Safety Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991).46 Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159
(1987).
47 See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 4, at 516 ("In many cases, the interpretation at issue
was announced so long after the rule was issued that it is unlikely that the agency
decisionmakers who issued the interpretation played any role in the decisionmaking process
that led to the issuance of the rule."); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 4, at 1455-56; see
also Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr. at the Waterfront, 193 F.3d 730, 733,
737 (3d Cir. 1999).
48A separate question is whether the agency officials are motivated to uncover the
original intent or instead want to advance their own policy goals, in which case they are
unlikely to honor the original intent. This question of motive is a basic problem in any
principal-agent relationship and exists when courts review agency statutory interpretations
too. In that context, the agency may not be motivated to interpret its enabling statute
consistent with Congress's intended meaning because the agency may be run by officials
who have different preferences than Congress.
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finalizing their rules.49 However, agencies receive Seminole Rock deference
regardless of procedural formality.50 Agency regulatory interpretations issued
through informal adjudication, post hoc litigation briefs, and interpretive rules
and informal guidance documents have all received Seminole Rock deference,
even though these procedures provide less notice than that obtained through
notice-and-comment procedures. 51 This procedural difference has led some to
criticize Seminole Rock deference. The basic concern is that the lack of
procedure enables agencies to issue binding interpretations that have retroactive
effect without affording regulated entities either the opportunity to comment on
the new binding norm or to alter their conduct to avoid punishment under the
new norm.52 In other words, the first time a regulated entity hears about a
binding regulatory interpretation may be when the agency is sanctioning the
entity for not complying with that interpretation. This Section shows how
doctrinal developments, in particular the holding in Christopher, have largely
mitigated this fair notice problem for Seminole Rock, leaving the anti-self-
interpretation critique discussed in the next section as the primary challenge to
the doctrine.
For decades, courts have sought to shield regulated entities from the harsh
effects of binding regulatory interpretations issued without fair notice. For
example, in a 1987 D.C. Circuit case, a company had applied for a license from
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).53 While reviewing the
application, the FCC interpreted an ambiguity in its regulation to render the
company's application untimely. 54 Although the agency's interpretation was
reasonable and ordinarily worthy of Seminole Rock deference, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the agency's retroactive application of the interpretation, explaining:
49United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (referring to notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication as the paradigmatic procedures to which
Chevron deference applies); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction
of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REv. 2009, 2043-45 (2011) (justifying the link
between Chevron and procedural formality). But see Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the
Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 771, 771-73 (2002); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 469 (2002).
50 See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4, at 1308.
51 For example, the Fourth Circuit deferred under Seminole Rock to the Army Corps of
Engineers' interpretation of its own regulation when the interpretation was made as part of
an informal process in which the Corps issued permits to mining companies discharging
materials from mining activities into mountain valleys. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth,
Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 430, 447 (4th Cir. 2003).
52 See Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CI. L. REv. 1705, 1720
(2007); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 4, at 1479-81. The retroactive application of
regulatory interpretations has been a subject of much discussion by tax scholars in particular.
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land of Tax Code
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 239, 269-71; see also United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842-44 (2012).




"The agency's interpretation is entitled to deference, but if it wishes to use that
interpretation to cut off a party's right, it must give full notice of its
interpretation."55 Presumably, if the agency had announced the interpretation
before the company filed its application, the court would have accepted the
agency's interpretation because the company would have had fair notice about
the proper timing requirement.
The Supreme Court made fair notice in regulatory interpretation cases the
law of the land in Christopher, which, as discussed earlier, held that Seminole
Rock deference does not apply if the agency's interpretation would come as an
"unfair surprise" to regulated entities. 56 By carving out this exception to
Seminole Rock, the Court quelled concerns that the lack of procedural formality
in Seminole Rock cases deprives regulated entities of adequate notice. One
commentator has cautiously lauded Christopher for potentially "address[ing]
the most substantial problems with [Seminole Rock] deference," 57 while others
have noted that Christopher "remove[s] any doubt that where a
defendant ... faces punishment, the standards of conduct giving rise to such
punishment must be reasonably discernible before the punishment is
imposed."58
Some could argue that, even after Christopher, Seminole Rock deference is
problematic because Christopher only requires that regulated entities receive
"fair notice"-an unclear standard that likely will not produce notice equivalent
to that obtained through notice-and-comment procedures used in Chevron cases.
However, this concern overlooks the fact that Seminole Rock cases typically
involve narrower agency actions than Chevron cases do and thus should not be
subject to the same procedural rigor. Recall that the Supreme Court has
established an anti-parroting principle under which agencies only receive
Seminole Rock deference if the regulations significantly narrow the scope or
clarify the enabling statute.59 This principle ensures that regulations are
typically narrower than enabling statutes, and as a result agency regulatory
interpretations at issue in Seminole Rock cases are on the whole narrower in
scope than agency statutory interpretations at issue in Chevron cases. 60 From a
public welfare perspective, it makes sense that the broader agency actions in
Chevron cases are subject to more procedure. Procedures can generate benefits
55 Id. at 4.
56 Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
57 The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 357, 364 (2012);
see also Stack, supra note 4, at 411 & n.279 (noting how Christopher allays some fair notice
concerns).
58Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and Universal
Principle of "Fair Notice, " 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 193, 194 (2013).
59 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
60 See Aneil Kovvali, Seminole Rock and the Separation of Powers, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 849, 863-64 (2013).
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like fair notice, but they also consume resources and cause delay.61 We ought to
balance these procedural costs and benefits by applying the costliest procedures
to the government actions that are broadest in scope and thus can do the greatest
harm if not taken properly.62 By requiring less procedure in comparatively
narrow Seminole Rock cases, administrative law is consistent with this principle
of tailoring procedure to the scope of government action.
Overall, Christopher ensures that regulated entities have some notice before
courts afford agencies Seminole Rock deference. The Christopher holding has
blunted the most serious fair notice concerns about Seminole Rock deference,
leaving the anti-self-interpretation critique as the most problematic for the
doctrine.
D. The Anti-self-interpretation Critique of Seminole Rock Deference
The anti-self-interpretation critique suggests that the Supreme Court should
overturn Seminole Rock because the doctrine violates a constitutional structural
norm against self-interpretation. 63 Below, I flesh out the rationales and
assumptions underlying this critique.
1. The Existence of the Anti-self-interpretation Norm
The critique's most central assumption is that a widespread anti-self-
interpretation norm exists. Manning sought to prove its existence by making
one general observation about the nature of the constitutional separation of
powers and two specific observations about what our Constitution leaves out.
The general observation is simply that our constitutional system places the
primary law-making function in Congress and then enables the executive and
the judiciary, but not Congress, to issue controlling interpretations of legislative
acts.64 Indeed, the Constitution does not just avoid congressional self-
interpretation, it also makes it difficult for Congress to control the interpretive
efforts of the President and the judiciary by insulating presidential and judicial
decisions from Congress. For example, the Constitution provides that electors
and not Congress select the President and that federal judges have life tenure.65
61 See Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARuZ. ST. L.J. 183, 211-12
(2013) (discussing the opportunity costs of delayed action).62 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Administrative Procedure Acts in an Age of Comparative
Scarcity, 75 IOWA L. REV. 845, 847 (1990); cf Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The
Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
173, 241 (1997) ("At some point, participation begins to interfere with-and subverts-
deliberative values."). Professor Adam Samaha goes one step further, noting not only the
costs of too much procedure for government decision-making, but arguing that the
constitutional structure provides a global norm against excessive process. See Adam M.
Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 603 (2006).
63 See Manning, supra note 4, at 617.64 1d. at 641-43.
65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3; art. III, § 1.
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The Framers' concerns about self-interpretation are also evident by their
rejection of two specific proposals. First, the Framers considered whether
judges should counsel Presidents on whether to veto legislation. 66 The proposal
would have enabled self-interpretation because judges could help make law by
having a hand in the approval of legislation and then later have to interpret that
law through normal judicial review procedures. The Framers rejected the idea
because of concerns about self-interpretation. As one Framer argued: "Judges
ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from
the bias of having participated in its formation." 67 The Framers also rejected the
British practice of having one house of Parliament serve as a court of last
resort.68 For much of British history, the House of Lords heard appeals from the
British judiciary in some matters. 69 Because the House of Lords had
participated in the drafting of the laws, by acting as a high court, the House was
engaging in self-interpretation. Again, the Framers rejected the proposal
because of concerns that the power of self-interpretation could produce biased
and self-interested decision-making. As Alexander Hamilton explained, using
one house as a court of last resort could lead to bad interpretations because,
"[flrom a body which had had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we
could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the
application." 70
Taken together, these observations about our constitutional structure show
the existence of a norm against self-interpretation, Manning suggests.71
2. The Relevance of the Norm to Agency Self-Interpretation
Even if an anti-self-interpretation norm existed at the founding, it may not
be relevant to the issue of agency self-interpretation today. There must be some
problem that adherence to the norm would solve if applied to agencies. The
problem, Manning points out, is that the agency self-interpretation enabled by
Seminole Rock deference encourages self-interested agencies to craft unduly
vague rules. 72 As Manning explains, "when a lawmaker controls the
interpretation of its own laws, an important incentive for adopting transparent
and self-limiting rules is lost because any discretion created by an imprecise,
vague, or ambiguous law inures to the very entity that created it." 73
66 Manning, supra note 4, at 643-44.
67 1 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).68 Manning, supra note 4, at 644.
69 See R.B. Stevens, The Role of a Final Appeal Court in a Democracy: The House of
Lords Today, 28 MOD. L. REV. 509, 511 (1965).70 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
71 Manning, supra note 4, at 644.72 Id. at 647-48.
73Id.; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
2014] 305
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
To illustrate more precisely how Seminole Rock has this effect, imagine an
agency that is in the midst of drafting a proposed notice-and-comment
rulemaking on a complex matter. The agency has incomplete information about
the matter and will likely need to update the rule when more is known in a few
years. If the agency drafts a very specific and clear rule now, it will most likely
need to update the rule through amendments that require notice-and-comment
procedures. If the agency drafts a vague rule, it can update the rule through
regulatory interpretations that do not require these procedures. All else being
equal, a rational and self-interested agency is likely to choose the vague rule
because the agency can update its policies without expending the resources
needed to go through notice-and-comment procedures. However, if Seminole
Rock were overturned and replaced with a less deferential standard of review
for agency regulatory interpretations, agencies would be deterred from taking
this vague rule approach because their interpretations of the vague rule would
be less likely to survive judicial review.
This critique does not assume that vague regulations updated by regulatory
interpretations are inherently bad, though. If agencies oversee a fast-moving
field in which regulatory conditions rapidly change or regulated entities'
behaviors are significantly diverse, it may be optimal from a public welfare
perspective for agencies to maintain their flexibility with vague rules. 74 The
critique simply says that Seminole Rock deference provides an incentive for
agencies to write rules that are vaguer than optimal in order to maximize the
number of decisions that they can make through regulatory interpretations that
are not subject to rigorous procedural checks or stringent judicial review.
3. The Anti-self-interpretation Norm as a Canon of Construction
Assuming the existence of the anti-self-interpretation norm and its
relevance to agencies, the last step in the anti-self-interpretation critique is to
apply the norm as a canon of construction to determine the proper level of
deference for agency regulatory interpretations. This question is a matter of
statutory interpretation. 75 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
establishes judicial review of agency actions, is silent on the matter of how
much weight courts should afford to agency regulatory interpretations. 76 if a
74 Cf Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 181, 192-93 (2011)
(discussing how ambiguous statutory provisions provide agencies needed flexibility to adapt
to regulatory changes). The advantages of vague rulemaking track arguments about the
benefits of standards in the legal literature on rules and standards. See generally Colin S.
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
7 5 Manning, supra note 4, at 635-37. But see Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1293, 1295-97 (2012) (arguing that,
when statutes are silent, it is best to consider the judicial role as one not just of statutory
interpretation but also of administrative common law).
76 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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strong anti-self-interpretation norm exists, it can operate as a presumption
against treating agency regulatory interpretations as controlling. 77 Applying this
presumption suggests that the Supreme Court should abandon Seminole Rock
and establish courts as the primary interpreters of agency regulations instead of
agencies. 78 Manning argues in particular for Skidmore deference under which
agency regulatory interpretations would receive weight only based on their
"power to persuade" courts that their interpretations are correct. 79
In sum, the anti-self-interpretation critique rests on several key
assumptions: there is a strong norm against self-interpretation; the norm is
relevant to the issue of agency self-interpretation; and the Court should employ
the norm as a canon of construction. If these assumptions are accepted, it
follows that the Court should overturn Seminole Rock. For the purposes of this
Article, I will largely accept the second and third assumptions.80 However, the
next Part of this Article aims to dismantle the first and most central assumption
about the existence of a strong anti-self-interpretation norm.
III. SELF-INTERPRETATION PRACTICES BY CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT,
AND THE SUPREME COURT
To justify a court decision to overturn Seminole Rock, the anti-self-
interpretation norm must be robust enough to act as a presumption that informs
judicial creation of administrative law doctrine. Yet, no one to my knowledge
has systemically examined the extent and strength of the anti-self-interpretation
norm. Manning's treatment does not address instances of congressional self-
interpretation contemplated by the Constitution or self-interpretation by the
other branches of government more generally.8 ' This Part more fully examines
self-interpretation by the heads of all three branches of government.
7 7 Manning, supra note 4, at 638-54.
78 Id. at 681.
79 1d. at 687; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).80 There is a long debate about whether courts should use canons of construction. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 67 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of
Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 656-67 (1992); Stephen F.
Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to
You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 562-66 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose
Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 579, 583-87 (1992); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 941-47 (1992). The use of constitutional structure as
canons of construction may be particularly problematic because it applies structural norms
created at the founding to modem branches of government whose internal structure has
evolved significantly since then. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as
Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 887, 904-29 (2012).
81 Manning does not discuss presidential self-interpretation, and the discussion of
judicial self-interpretation is contained to one footnote. Manning, supra note 4, at 648 n. 175.
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My general claim in this Part is that the anti-self-interpretation norm is not
an inviolable mainstay of our constitutional system and should not be
understood as a presumption that grounds constitutional and administrative law
inquiries. At most, anti-self-interpretation is a norm that is followed sometimes
but not others. More precisely, I claim that the anti-self-interpretation norm
trades off against competing institutional values, and self-interpretation often
exists when these competing considerations plausibly outweigh the risks from
self-interpretation. 82 Constitutional designers have also allowed self-
interpretation when there are mechanisms that sufficiently protect against the
abuse of self-interpretation powers. 83
I advance these claims in three sections that explore the use of self-
interpretation by the heads of each branch of government. My methodology in
these sections is not to reveal the original intent of the founders but rather to
unpack the actual, persistent structural features of our constitutional system as
they relate to self-interpretation by these actors. Throughout the discussion in
these sections, my institutional analysis also adds insight into the self-
interpretation aspects of other areas of law.
Before going further, a couple of clarifying points are needed. First, we
need a working definition of law-making and law-interpreting. Law-making is
the act of establishing authoritative legal texts. Law-interpreting is the cognitive
act of understanding or explicating a legal text's meaning. 84 The line between
law-making and law-interpreting is not always clear because one can draft new
legal text in order to explicate the meaning of older legal text, seemingly
making and interpreting law at the same time. For example, when Congress
amends a statute to clarify terms in the old statutory language, it plausibly can
be said to be making law by writing new statutory text and interpreting law by
clarifying existing statutory text. This Article follows Manning by assuming
that interpretation does not include the act of altering the language in the
authoritative text that is being interpreted, and thus congressional amendments
are acts of law-making and not law-interpreting.85 Other definitional
assumptions will be discussed as they arise.
82 Cf Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality,
122 YALE L.J. 384, 389 (2012) (arguing that the principle that no man should be a judge in
his own case "constantly trades off against and competes with other values" and is not "a
mainstay of our system of government").
83 Cf Douglas S. Massey et al., Of Myths and Markets, 606 ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 8, 28 (2006) ("A variety of 'second-order' institutional mechanisms are capable of
satisfying the first-order requirements for sustained economic growth.").
84 See David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist
Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 137 (1985).
85 Manning, supra note 4, at 645-48. An even more difficult example to classify is the
Dictionary Act, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871), which in one statutory section provides
definitions that clarify the meaning of words used throughout the U.S. Code. When Congress
adds definitions to this section, it could be seen as an act of interpretation. However, to
maintain a useful distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, it is perhaps best to
view the Dictionary Act as an act of law-making that provides interpretive rules that tell
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Second, the analysis in this Part will include instances of partial self-
interpretation in which the primary law-interpreter did not draft the relevant
legal text alone but was one of multiple law-makers. For example, partial self-
interpretation exists when the Senate has the power to interpret statutes that it
drafted along with the House.86 Manning, citing Alexander Hamilton,
considered partial self-interpretation by one house of Congress in his analysis.87
I will follow Manning, following Hamilton, and examine institutions that allow
partial self-interpretation as well.
A. Congressional Self-Interpretation
The Constitution can be read as establishing a default rule that Congress
does not have the power of self-interpretation except when specific provisions
give Congress that power. Generally, Congress lacks the power of self-
interpretation because, after Congress enacts a statute, neither the whole body
nor any individual house has the power to offer controlling interpretations of
that statute. Congress can draft amendments or new legislation, but it cannot
authoritatively expound on the meaning of a text without altering the terms of
the statutory text. However, express constitutional provisions contemplate that
Congress or one house of Congress will have binding self-interpretation powers
in at least a couple of instances: when impeaching government officers and
voting to confirm presidential appointees.88 Aside from these exceptions,
Congress retains some interpretive power through legislative history, which
courts look to for guidance out of respect for the views of the more
representative legislators. 89 The use of legislative history by courts suggests that
the anti-self-interpretation norm for Congress is at least weakened when there
are competing values at play.
This Section proceeds by first discussing congressional self-interpretation
through impeachment trials and confirmation hearings. It then discusses
congressional interpretive influence through legislative history. It concludes by
discussing the importance and limits of these findings for the question of
whether a robust, universal anti-self-interpretation norm exists.
courts how to interpret statutes. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1697 (2002) (referring to the Dictionary
Act as a repository of "interpretive rules").
86 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1755 (2002) (noting how Congress itself recognizes a distinction between
each individual house of Congress and the collective entity of Congress).87 Manning, supra note 4, at 644.88U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. II, § 2, cls. 2, 6.
89 See infra Part III.A.3.
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1. Congressional Self-interpretation Through Impeachment Hearings
The Constitution provides that the House impeaches and the Senate tries
public officials for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." 90
These impeachment processes can involve self-interpretation because Congress
drafts statutes that define treason, bribery, and other high crimes, and then each
house of Congress must interpret these statutes to perform their impeachment
functions in individual cases. For example, legislators had to interpret federal
statutes defining peijury and obstruction of justice to determine whether
President Clinton should be removed from office because he committed these
crimes.91 Similarly, legislators had to interpret the Tenure of Office Act 92 to
determine whether President Johnson committed a high crime by violating that
Act and should be removed from office.93
The benefit of placing impeachment functions with legislators is that it
allows popular representatives to make what is essentially a political decision
about whether a President or other official is fit to remain in office.94 The risk,
though, is that legislators can take advantage of vague definitions of treason and
other high crimes that they enacted by interpreting these definitions in
individual impeachment cases to fit their partisan needs. 95 The Framers
understood that the houses' impeachment powers entailed an interpretive
function, but they nevertheless countenanced these instances of self-
interpretation because they believed that alternative arrangements involved
worse tradeoffs. 96 They debated whether the Supreme Court should try
impeached officials but rejected the idea because some of the sitting Justices
would likely have been appointed by the impeached President, and thus they
may be biased in his favor.97 Moreover, the Justices may later have to rule on
criminal or civil charges against the impeached official and would have biased
90 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; art. II, § 4.
91 See 144 CONG. REc. Hl 1, 967-68 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998).
92 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (repealed 1887).
93 See Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut: Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must Be
Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 383 (2000).
94 As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 65, impeachment is a
"NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men .. . [and] who can so properly be
the inquisitors for the nation as the [elected] representatives of the nation themselves?" THE
FEDERALIST No. 65, at 376 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
9 5 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARv. L. REv. 915, 953 (2005) (describing how party affiliation drove the impeachment
votes in President Clinton's case).
96 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)
(discussing impeachment as "the judicial character of the Senate"); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 291, 307 (1999).
97 Michael F. Williams, Rehnquist's Renunciation? The Chief Justice's Constitutional
Duty To "Preside" over Impeachment Trials, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 457, 467 (2002).
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themselves if they had already ruled on the impeachment of the official. 98 These
concerns could have been ameliorated with the creation of a special court of
impeachments that only performed impeachment functions. However, a
proposal for such a body was rejected in part because it "would either be
attended with heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of
casualties and inconveniencies." 99
Ultimately, the Framers opted for an impeachment scheme with legislative
self-interpretation because alternative arrangements came with high costs and
worse tradeoffs.
2. Congressional Self-interpretation Through Senate Confirmation
The Constitution also enables Senate self-interpretation through the
Senate's confirmation function.' 00 The Constitution provides that the Senate
must confirm presidential nominees for "Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law."' 0 Congress has enacted statutes that provide
minimum qualifications for nominees to some of these seats. 102 These
qualifications include restrictions on demographic characteristics, political party
affiliations, expertise, experience and conflicts of interest. 103 When the Senate
reviews these nominations they must determine whether those nominees meet
the congressionally set qualifications-that is, the Senate must interpret
statutory qualifications that it had a hand in writing. Even when no express
qualifications are required for an office, legislators have written statutory duties
for that office and Senators must interpret those duties to determine whether a
nominee has the skills for the job as statutorily described.
The risk of allowing partial self-interpretation in appointments hearings is
that Senators will make partisan determinations of whether a nominee's skills
match statutory requirements. Republican Senators could conclude that
Republican nominees met the qualifications but Democratic nominees did not,
and vice versa for Democratic Senators. For example, Republican Senators
blocked President Obama's nominee to the Federal Reserve Board, economist
Peter Diamond, purportedly because they narrowly interpreted the Board's
statutory purview to require the skills of macroeconomists and monetary
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 377 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
99 Id. at 378.
100 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10 1Id
102 More than forty percent of agencies created by legislation between 1946 and 1995
(seventy-four agencies) have restrictions placed on the qualifications of agency officials. See
William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POLITICS
1095, 1098-99 & tbl. 1 (2002).
103 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 929 (2009).
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specialists but not labor economists like Diamond, although many believed the
real reason was partisan opposition to Diamond. 104
The Framers could have avoided this problem of self-interpretation by
removing the requirement of Senate confirmation for presidential appointees.
However, the Framers were concerned that the absence of the Senate's check on
nominees would enable Presidents to abuse their power and make self-
interested appointments. 0 In other words, to counteract presidential self-
interest, the Framers created an institution that entails Senate self-interpretation
because the benefits of checking the President here plausibly outweighed the
costs from self-interpretation.
Also, although not mentioned in the Framers' debates, the presidential veto
power may act as a particularly effective procedural check on the Senate's self-
interpretation power because legislation on appointee qualifications directly
constrains the President, who thus has an especially strong incentive to police
legislation and veto unacceptable terms. Indeed, the White House often
chastises Congress for proposing statutory qualifications for executive offices
filled by presidential appointment.106
3. Congressional Interpretive Influence Through Legislative History
A world with the strongest possible anti-self-interpretation norm would be
one in which the interpretive views of the law-making body would be accorded
no weight at all. This is not the world we live in. For more than a century, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have afforded some interpretive influence to
legislative history out of respect for the views of the more representative law-
makers.' 0 7 This judicial use of legislative history does not lead to pure self-
interpretation as I have defined the term because, even when courts give
legislative history some interpretive weight, the courts remain the primary
104 Binyamin Appelbaum, Frustration Grows as Nominee for the Fed Withdraws, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2011, at Bl.
105 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 76:
[Senate confirmation] would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the
President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from
State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity. And, in addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the
administration.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
106 In fact, the White House often criticizes Congress's practice of establishing
minimum qualifications for agency position. O'Connell, supra note 103, at 929.
107 See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57,
97-102 (1998); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107
YALE L.J. 529, 548 (1997) (arguing that the judicial use of legislative history is legitimate
"in light of our longstanding traditions").
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interpreters of the statutes.108 Nevertheless, judicial resort to legislative history
is evidence of the notion that adherence to an absolute anti-self-interpretation
norm is relaxed when confronted with countervailing values.
To illustrate the aspects of self-interpretation involved in the judicial use of
legislative history, consider the case of Steadman v. SEC,109 in which the
Supreme Court had to interpret the APA to determine the standard for imposing
administrative sanctions. Because the statutory language was vague, 110 the
Court looked to and adopted the interpretive view contained in the House
committee report, which expressly adopted a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.' 1 ' By giving weight to the committee's view, the Court afforded the
legislators on the committee interpretive influence over statutory language they
drafted.
Some have attacked the judicial use of legislative history by arguing that
legislative history may not provide reliable indicators of legislative intent
because it represents the interpretive statements of only a few legislators whose
views may not have been enacted if stated expressly in the statute. 112 In
particular, one risk is that legislators will draft vague statutory language that on
its face does not alienate too many other legislators, only to fill in the specifics
with statements in legislative history that courts will examine for guidance."13
Despite this risk, courts have long looked to legislative history as a way to
discern legislative intent.1 14 Some forms of legislative history are more reliable
indicators of legislative intent than others, and Supreme Court doctrine has
established a hierarchy of legislative history that affords weight based on how
closely the legislative source reflects the intent of the enacting Congress.115
Under this hierarchy, committee reports from the committee that drafted and
reviewed the legislation rank at the top along with statements from the statutes'
sponsors. 116 Committee reports are considered the best evidence of agreement
between both houses because the reports from each house are often identical or
else the reports explain how the two houses decided to resolve differences in
bills that passed each chamber.11 7 Floor debates and hearing testimony are
afforded weight too but are less authoritative because they are more likely to
108 Another difference is that legislative history is usually made before a statute is
enacted, while interpretation (and self-interpretation) in the usual sense of the word occurs
after a law has been made. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a
System ofSeparated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1457, 1460 (2000).
109450 U.S. 91, 97 (1981).
I10 The Court called it "opaque." Id at 100.
IllId. at 101.
112 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
'13 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REv. 423, 423 (1988).
1 14 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 356-58.
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reflect the views of individual legislators instead of the majority of both
houses." 8 Similarly, courts afford more weight to congressional sources of
legislative history than to presidential sources, such as signing statements that
interpret statutory phrases, because the congressional sources are more likely to
accurately reveal the drafters' preferences."l 9 In short, the more reliably a
source of legislative history reflects legislative intent, the more weight courts
are likely to afford it, up to but not beyond the point at which the court could be
said to cede primary interpretive authority to the legislators.
Overall, for many decades, a majority of sitting Supreme Court Justices
have viewed legislative history as a legitimate guide for judges in statutory
interpretation cases. This practice implies that, at least for these Justices, the
robustness of the anti-self-interpretation norm for Congress wanes in the face of
competing values, such as the value of democratic representativeness that is
arguably advanced when courts look to the views of the elected representatives
who enacted the laws.
4. The Limits of Congressional Self-Interpretation
This Section has discussed two discrete exceptions to the norm against
congressional self-interpretation and shown how the strength of the norm is
relaxed in the context of judicial use of legislative history. These findings by
themselves are not enough to disprove the existence of a robust anti-self-
interpretation norm for a couple of reasons. First, the discrete examples of
congressional self-interpretation are based on express constitutional provisions
and can be read as providing constitutionally sanctioned exceptions to a general
anti-self-interpretation norm. Second, many scholars and jurists, including
Manning and Scalia, view judicial use of legislative history as a constitutionally
shaky practice that is just as vulnerable to attack as Seminole Rock deference. 120
For them, citing the judicial use of legislative history as indirect support for
Seminole Rock deference is simply citing one bad doctrine as support for
another.
Nevertheless, the instances of legislative self-interpretation discussed here
substantially weaken the claim that a robust anti-self-interpretation norm exists
by showing that, even for our constitutional system's primary law-makers in
Congress, constitutional designers have permitted self-interpretation when
competing norms and values outweigh the costs of self-interpretation. The next
two sections build on this insight by showing how the pervasiveness of
118Id. at 639.
1191d. at 636-37. For an argument that presidential signing statements should, under
some conditions, receive as much weight as ordinary legislative history, see Curtis A.
Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST.
COmmENT. 307, 352-56 (2006).
120 See Eskridge, supra note 115, at 652-64; see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 719 (1997).
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presidential and judicial self-interpretation undermine the notion of a universal
constitutional norm against self-interpretation.
B. Presidential Self-Interpretation
Presidential self-interpretation is a widespread and persistent part of our
constitutional system. This Section illustrates how Presidents exercise self-
interpretation in three contexts: judicial deference to presidential law-making;
the President's power to oversee agency actions; and the President's power to
recommend legislation. In each of these contexts, self-interpretation has its
costs, but they are plausibly outweighed by competing institutional values
associated with presidential decision-making.
1. Presidential Self-interpretation Through Judicial Deference to
Executive Law-Making
Presidents often make law. 12 1 For example, Presidents make law when they
enter into agreements with other nations under their Article II foreign affairs
powers,122 or when they issue regulations under authority delegated to them by
Congress. When Presidents make law, they must interpret the underlying
constitutional or statutory provisions that authorize their actions. Sometimes
courts defer to these presidential interpretations by invoking the political
question doctrine, which holds that the political branches should receive
absolute deference on questions for which courts cannot craft judicially
manageable standards.123 Other times, courts accept the President's
interpretation after affording the President highly deferential review because of
the President's national accountability, expertise, and ability as chief executive
to maintain uniformity and act with dispatch. Presidents are most likely to
receive absolute or strong judicial deference in foreign affairs and national
security cases because the President's institutional advantages over Congress
and courts are greatest here.124 These basic propositions of judicial deference to
121 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring
the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 148-67 (2009) (discussing the President's constitutional
and statutory authority to make international law).
122 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649,
661 (2000).
123 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
124 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 329-30
(2002). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that it has a "customary policy of deference to
the President in matters of foreign affairs." Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005). When there is a crisis that involves foreign affairs and national
security, judicial deference is at its peak. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003).
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Presidents have been much discussed in the legal literature. 125 What has been
overlooked, though, is that courts also afford absolute or strong judicial
deference to presidential self-interpretations.
The President's ability to self-interpret has never been seriously questioned,
so long as the matter is one in which courts would ordinarily defer to the
President's interpretation of the underlying statutory or constitutional authority.
Consider the President's constitutional authority to "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers."l 26 Courts have long accepted as controlling presidential
decisions that interpret and implement this provision.127 They have also
accepted as controlling the President's interpretations of presidentially made
law derived from this provision. For example, in the 1890 Supreme Court case
In re Baiz,128 a U.S. citizen, Jacob Baiz, sought recognition as foreign minister
representing Honduras. The State Department, acting for the President,
explained that there was a policy "to decline to recognize American citizens as
the accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign powers." 29 While there
were rare exceptions, Baiz did not meet these exceptions, the State Department
explained.130 The Court accepted the President's view as controlling because
"we do not assume to sit in judgment upon the decision of the executive in
reference to the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign
minister." 31
The Baiz case involved -self-interpretation because Presidents had
established a general rule against recognizing American citizens as foreign
representatives, and a President was now authoritatively interpreting that rule to
determine that Baiz did not fall into one of the rule's exceptions. A Court
committed to avoiding self-interpretation by Presidents would have insisted that
it and not the President determine whether Baiz qualified for an exception. This
anti-self-interpretation approach would have minimized the risk that Presidents
could abuse their self-interpretation power by granting exemptions to friends
and political supporters but not others. Despite this risk, the Court was inclined
125 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 124, at 329-30; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1163-66 (2008); Aziz Z. Huq,
Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (2013) (summarizing the
doctrinal triggers for the political question doctrine); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 748-57
(2007).
126 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 361 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No.
15,971) ("The constitution of the United States having vested in the president the power to
receive ambassadors and other public ministers, has necessarily bestowed upon that branch
of the government, not only the right, but the exclusive right, to judge of the credentials of
the ministers so received . ... ).
128 135 U.S. 403, 422 (1890).
129Id. at 411.
130Id.
131 Id. at 432.
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to accept the President's self-interpretation as controlling because of his
institutional advantages handling foreign affairs. The benefits of presidential
decision-making here trumped the costs from self-interpretation.
A more recent example of presidential self-interpretation and its risks
concerns the issuance of what are called "presidential permits." For decades,
Presidents have used their constitutional foreign affairs powers to administer
regulatory schemes in which private companies must apply for and receive
permits issued by the President before they transport energy across international
boundaries.132 Presidents have published regulatory standards for when permits
should be issued and then interpreted those standards in individual cases when
companies apply for permits. 133 No presidential permit case has reached the
Supreme Court, but lower courts have accepted the practice as constitutional
and the President's self-interpretations as controlling.134 Again, under this
power of self-interpretation, Presidents can craft unduly vague standards that
provide less than optimal notice to companies ex ante and then fill in the details
later with interpretations. For example, the President is currently using his self-
interpretation power to assess the permit application for the controversial
Keystone XL Pipeline System, a pipeline that would transport oil sands from
Canada to the United States. 135 The President has established that pipelines like
Keystone XL should receive permits if the projects "serve the national
interest."1 36 The President must now self-interpret this vague standard to
determine whether the Keystone XL project qualifies.
Courts also accept presidential interpretations when the President was not
the sole drafter of the law, as in cases interpreting treaties and executive
agreements that were drafted with other signatory nations. While there is some
debate about the level of deference courts give to presidential treaty
interpretations,137 the most persuasive scholarship has shown that judicial
deference in treaty cases is a function of the foreign affairs implications in the
case. When the issue is one that has a significant impact on American relations
with foreign countries, courts are more likely to accept the President's
interpretation because these are cases in which the President's comparative
132 Exec. Order No. 13,337, 3 C.F.R. 165 (2004); Exec. Order No. 10,485, 3 C.F.R. 970
(1953); Exec. Order No. 8202, 3 C.F.R. 560 (1939). For a discussion of how Presidents have
used these schemes to gain power over Congress, see Jason Marisam, The President's
Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADmIN. L. REv. 821 (2013).
133 Exec. Order No. 13,337, 3 C.F.R. 166 (2004).
134 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105,
111-13 (D.D.C. 2009).
135 See New Keystone XL Pipeline Application, DEP'T STATE, http://www.keystonepipe
line-xl.state.gov/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
136 Exec. Order No. 13,337, 3 C.F.R. 166 (2004).
137 For example, compare Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1201-02 (2007), with Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1245-46 (2007).
20 14] 3 17
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
advantages are greatest.138 Because treaty cases often involve foreign affairs,
courts often accept presidential treaty interpretations. The data suggests that the
President's interpretative stance is "the single best predictor of interpretive
outcomes in American treaty cases."1 39 In other words, courts often let
Presidents self-interpret treaties.
The presence of additional parties in the treaty-making process provides a
constraint on the President that makes presidential self-interpretation of treaties
less problematic than presidential self-interpretation in cases where the
President was the sole drafter of the law. When the President is the sole drafter
and primary interpreter of laws, he can abuse this power by crafting unduly
vague laws that preserve his flexibility to interpret those laws later. This
concern is of less magnitude in treaty cases because the treaty text must be
acceptable to the other signing nations and the Senate, which must approve
treaties by a two-thirds vote. These parties can reject treaties replete with textual
language, vague or otherwise, that they dislike. As a result, the structure and
procedure of treaty cases provide a check on the President's ability to abuse his
self-interpretation power. This finding does not mean that deference to
presidential treaty interpretations should be greater than deference to Presidents
in cases where they are the sole law-maker. The proper level of weight given to
presidential interpretations of treaties is a contested issue that involves many
significant factors aside from the risk of abuse from self-interpretation.140 My
point is simply that, if we isolate risks derived from the President's self-
interpretation power, these risks are possibly lower in treaty cases because it is
more difficult for the President as law-maker to craft the legal text in order to
preserve maximum flexibility for his interpretive options later.
138 See, e.g., Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 777,
791 (2008) ("When enough concerns arise about the potential foreign effects of an
interpretive decision, [the court] defers."); Tim Wu, Treaties'Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571,
573 (2007) (claiming that judicial enforcement of treaties "turns mainly on who is accused
of being the party in breach and the perceived competence of the judiciary to offer a
remedy").
139 David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1015 (1994). This deference did not exist at the nation's founding, though. See
Sullivan, supra note 138, at 788 (discussing how, in nineteen cases dealing
with treaty interpretation in the early 1800s, the Court agreed with the Executive's
interpretation only three times).
140 Indeed, some scholars have argued that presidential treaty interpretations should
receive less weight than interpretations in cases where the President was the sole law-maker
because treaty interpretations should not be governed by the President alone but by the
shared expectations of the parties. See Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and
Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1930 (2003). At least one commentator includes
the Senate as a treaty-making partner whose views share equal weight with the executive.
See David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms
Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1989). However, others argue that the
Senate's power to veto treaties does not make it equal to the President in the treaty-making
process. See Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation:
Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1481, 1482-83 (1989).
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Overall, if the interpretive question implicates significant foreign relations
concerns, courts tend to accept the President's self-interpretations as controlling
because of the benefits of presidential decision-making.
2. Self-interpretation Through the President's Agency Oversight Powers
Presidents routinely issue executive orders or presidential memoranda that
direct agencies to enact policies.141 Presidents then interpret these orders to
determine whether agencies have complied with them. We should not
necessarily count these interpretations as self-interpretations, though. Self-
interpretation, as I have defined the term, requires that the interpretations be
legally controlling. There is a large debate about whether and when presidential
oversight actions generally are legally binding on agencies, with the answer
depending on one's theory of executive power and the conditions under which
the action was taken. Thus, whether presidential interpretations of agency
directives are binding self-interpretations depends on theory and context. This
subsection describes the scope of the President's self-interpretation power under
three leading and competing theories of presidential oversight powers.
Adherents of the unitary executive theory believe that presidential
directives to all agencies are legally binding because the Constitution contains a
"grant to the president of all of the executive power, which includes the power
to remove and direct all lower-level executive officials" at his will.142 If the
President has plenary power to issue binding orders to agencies, by extension,
he should have the power to issue binding interpretations of those orders. In
other words, under the unitary executive theory, the President has plenary
power to self-interpret his directives to agencies. To illustrate self-interpretation
under this theory, consider the Obama Administration's efforts to combat
climate change. In June, 2013, President Obama issued a memorandum
directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate climate
change through "approaches that allow the use of market-based instruments,
performance standards, and other regulatory flexibilities." 43 The agency is
working on a proposed rule, which the White House will review. This review
process will entail self-interpretation because the White House must interpret
the President's memorandum to determine whether the EPA has fulfilled the
President's objectives. If the White House concludes that the agency has not
complied with the President's memorandum, the EPA is legally bound to accept
the conclusion and rework its proposal accordingly, much the way an agency
must respond to a court's interpretation that the agency has not complied with a
statutory directive.
141 See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REv. 539, 541 (2005).
142 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXEcUTIVE 3-4
(2008).
143 Presidential Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, President
Obama, to EPA (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards.
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Some scholars and jurists, most notably Justice Elena Kagan, have
advanced a somewhat less strong view of the President's oversight power that is
rooted in statutory interpretation presumptions.144 Kagan has argued that, when
Congress delegates statutory authority to agencies, these delegations should be
read as granting the President the power to direct the agencies' implementation
of those statutes. 145 However, when Congress delegates authority to an
independent agency, the statute should not be read as granting the President
directive power because Congress's purpose in choosing the independent
agency was to insulate decision-making from the President.146 For our purposes,
the President's lack of authority to control independent agencies means that he
cannot issue binding interpretations of his directives to those agencies. Under
this view, President Obama's directive to the EPA and self-interpretation of that
directive are binding. But, if we swap an independent agency like the Securities
Exchange Commission for the EPA, neither the President's directive nor his
interpretation of that directive would be legally binding.
Another leading theory holds that Presidents lack the general constitutional
or statutory power to direct agency actions taken pursuant to congressionally
delegated authority.147 A President only retains the power to direct agencies
when he is acting pursuant to statutory authority that Congress delegated
expressly to the President.148 Under this theory, the President's interpretation of
his directive to the EPA would not be a controlling self-interpretation. However,
a President can self-interpret a directive that was based on his own statutory
authority. For example, the President has express statutory authority to respond
to oil spillS.1 49 Under this authority, the President has directed the Navy to
develop a long-range plan to restore the Gulf of Mexico after the Deepwater
Horizon spill in 2010.150 The President can issue controlling self-interpretations
of this directive that determine whether the Navy has complied with the initial
order.
Ultimately, while the scope of the President's self-interpretation power
through agency directives depends on one's theory of executive power
generally, under any of three leading schools of thought, there is at least some
domain of cases in which the President has the power to issue controlling self-
interpretations of agency directives.
Whether the President's power of self-interpretation through agency
directives is broad or narrow, the self-interpretation power gives Presidents an
advantage over Congress. When Congress issues statutory commands to
144 Kagan, supra note 15, at 2327.
14 5 See id. at 2369.
146Id. at 2327.
147 Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106
CoLuM. L. REv. 263, 277 (2006); Strauss, supra note 125, at 704-05.
148 Stack, supra note 147, at 269.
14933 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2012).




agencies, it knows that the agencies and not Congress will act as primary
interpreters of those commands under Chevron deference. Accordingly,
Congress has an incentive to speak clearly because, otherwise, the agencies can
interpret the vagueness as they see fit and not necessarily as Congress would
prefer.151 By contrast, when a President issues binding directives to agencies, he
has the power to self-interpret those directives. Accordingly, a President lacks
the same incentive to issue clear directives to agencies because, if the
President's directives are vague, he retains the authority to interpret those
directives and determine whether the agencies are implementing them as he
would prefer. This distinction provides Presidents a key advantage over
Congress because, when issuing legally binding directives to agencies,
Presidents need not invest as many resources ex ante to ensure they provide
clear direction to agencies.
3. Presidential Self-interpretation Through Recommending Legislation
A final form of presidential self-interpretation comes from the
Constitution's mandate that the President recommend legislation for Congress
to pass.152 Under this authority, Presidents submit many bills for Congress to
consider.153 Some view the President's exercise of this power as legislative-
that is, the President is behaving like a law-maker because he is designing
legislation, which he may ultimately vote to approve by signing into law.154
Under this view, if the President's recommended legislation includes authority
that the President must implement, the President has the power of self-
interpretation because he must interpret legislation that he wrote. For example,
President Franklin Roosevelt used his recommendation power to push through
New Deal-era legislation that he had crafted.155 This legislation included
provisions that the President himself would have to implement.156 Thus, one
could reasonably say that President Roosevelt self-interpreted legislation.
The primary risk of this presidential self-interpretation is that the President
will recommend legislation that grants him broad powers. Indeed, many were
concerned that President Roosevelt had secured too much power for himself
151 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that, because "whatever [Congress] leaves vague in the statute will be worked out by
someone else . . . Congress's incentive is to speak as clearly as possible on the matters it
regards as important").
152 U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. For one of the few academic discussions of the clause, see J.
Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2079 (1989).
153 See Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century
World, 48 ARK. L. REv. 1, 8 (1994).
154 See Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief 44 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1, 4-7 (2002).
155Id. at 52.
156 See, e.g., National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
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through legislation that he recommended.'1 7 However, this risk is balanced by
the benefits of having a nationally elected chief executive, with expertise
implementing statutes, recommend legislation to a Congress full of legislators
who represent individual districts and have little if any experience
implementing statutes. Moreover, there is an obvious procedural check on
presidential self-dealing through legislative recommendations: any presidential
recommendation must be approved by both houses of Congress. Thus, while the
recommendation power can be said to commingle law-making and law-
interpreting powers in the President, the benefits of the recommendation power
and the procedural check on its use make it a worthwhile institution.
Overall, presidential self-interpretation exists as a function of judicial
deference to presidential law-making, the President's agency-oversight powers,
and the President's recommendation power. Presidential self-interpretation has
persisted mostly because of the many institutional benefits associated with
presidential decision-making.
C. Judicial Self-Interpretation
Like presidential self-interpretation, judicial self-interpretation is rampant in
our constitutional system. This Section illustrates how courts, in particular the
Supreme Court, have exercised self-interpretation in three contexts: adherence
to stare decisis principles; the formation of judicial common law; and the
creation of judicial rules of governance. In each of these contexts, self-
interpretation has its costs but they are plausibly outweighed by competing
institutional values. This Section discusses self-interpretation in each of these
contexts and concludes by discussing procedural and structural constraints that
mitigate the risk of judicial self-interpretation in general.
1. Judicial Self-interpretation Through Stare Decisis
The broadest and most important form of judicial self-interpretation results
from adherence to stare decisis norms. Stare decisis has both a vertical and
horizontal form,' 5 8 and judicial self-interpretation exists under both. There are
costs to judicial self-interpretation through vertical and horizontal stare decisis,
but the structures persist because their rule-of-law benefits plausibly outweigh
these costs.
Vertical stare decisis refers to the principle that decisions of a high court are
binding on lower courts. 159 This form of stare decisis leads to self-interpretation
15 7 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative
State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1613, 1680-81 (2009).
15 8 See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1453, 1460-63
(2010).
159 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (establishing that lower federal courts
must follow Supreme Court precedent and cannot depart from that precedent by anticipating
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because high courts reviewing the work of lower courts must interpret their
earlier opinions to assess whether the lower courts are acting in line with those
binding opinions. One potential cost of vertical stare decisis is that it can
encourage appellate courts to craft overly broad rules.160 Appeals courts review
a fraction of lower court cases because appeals are not always filed or, if
appellate jurisdiction is discretionary, the courts lack the resources to review too
many cases. 161 As a result, appeals courts cannot constrain lower courts by
frequently reviewing and reversing their work. Instead, if an appellate court
wants to influence the lower courts in the largest number of cases feasible, the
court must establish a broad rule "that limits the trial court judge's ability to
choose a decision that is at odds with the appeals court's preferred decision." 62
Broad judicial rules of the sort encouraged by vertical stare decisis have
been criticized for their decision and error costs. Decision costs refer to the
costs of drafting the decision, and these costs are higher with. broad rules
because the court must devote extra resources to develop a broad rule that
covers many situations instead of a narrow one that hews to the facts before the
court. 163 Error costs refer to the costs from an erroneous decision, and these
costs too are higher with broad rules because any mistake applies to more cases
than a mistaken narrow rule would.'6 There are of course costs to narrow
judicial rules too, 165 but the point here is that vertical stare decisis can generate
rules that are broader than optimal.
While self-interpretation through vertical stare decisis has its costs, the
benefits of such a structure are easy to understand. Imagine if vertical stare
decisis were replaced with a system in which appeals courts' rulings did not
bind trial courts. This system would reduce self-interpretation because appeals
courts would not interpret their own rulings to ensure that trial courts complied
with them. This system would also remove the incentive for appeals courts to
craft unduly broad rules because their rules, broad or narrow, would have no
force over trial courts. But abandoning vertical stare decisis would be disastrous
for judicial management and rule-of-law norms such as predictability. Potential
litigants would not know which rules governed their behavior because each trial
court, freed from having to follow opinions passed down from higher up the
how the Court will rule on the issue again in the future); see also Evan H. Caminker, Why
Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 (1994).160 See Hugo M. Mialon, Paul H. Rubin & Joel L. Schrag, Judicial Hierarchies and the
Rule-Individual Tradeoff 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 3, 4-5 (2007).
161 Id
162 d. at 5.
16 3 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 47 (1999).
164 See id. at 49.
165 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that broad and clear rules from the Supreme Court are desirable
because when the "Court instead issues a narrow, fact-bound (minimalist) decision, it leaves
a great deal to be decided by the lower courts in future cases and thereby delegates its
supreme law-declaration function to its judicial inferiors").
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judicial chain of command, could fashion its own rules. The costs of such
unpredictability justify maintaining a judicial hierarchy in which lower courts
are bound by higher courts' rulings, even if the maintenance of this structure
requires that we accept judicial self-interpretation through vertical stare decisis.
Judicial self-interpretation also exists through horizontal stare decisis,
which refers to the principle that decisions of a court either bind or influence
other courts that are at the same level in the judicial hierarchy and facing the
same or similar issues. 166 For our purposes, the horizontal stare decisis analysis
will be confined to how Supreme Court opinions set precedent that constrain
later Supreme Court decisions. There is a large debate about how Supreme
Court statutory and constitutional precedent ought to constrain the Supreme
Court.167 Some argue for absolute stare decisis under which the Court must
always adhere to its precedent.168 Others argue for abandoning stare decisis and
entirely freeing the Court to decide cases without the constraint of precedent.169
The current doctrine falls somewhere in the middle, with the Court affording
precedent a presumption of correctness that can be rebutted.170 Under this
doctrine, the Court first assesses the strength of the arguments against the
precedent. If those arguments do not meet the burden of rebutting the
precedent's correctness, the Court must interpret its own precedent and apply it
to the case at bar.
The self-interpretation that comes from horizontal stare decisis has its costs,
namely that it encourages the Supreme Court to craft vague rules.171 To
166 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2024-25
(1997).
167 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Michael Moore's Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1293, 1319-21 (1992) (discussing a metaphysical approach that supports giving weight to
precedent); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous Defendant: Criticizing
Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2450, 2453 (1990) (arguing
that absolute stare decisis "may exacerbate countermajoritarian features of our system");
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23,
23-24 (1994) (arguing that it is unconstitutional to follow precedent in some circumstances);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1548 (2000) (arguing that
"stare decisis is a policy judgment, not a rule of law specified in the Constitution or clearly
implicit in its provisions or overall structure").
168 See Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 183-84 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 n.45 (1988).
169 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22
CONsT. CoMMENT. 289, 298 (2005).
170 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1362-63 (1988); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87
VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2001).
171 My finding that horizontal stare decisis encourages vague rules is not inconsistent
with others finding that vertical stare decisis encourages broad rules. The two kinds of rules
are likely to arise under different conditions. The broad rules are more likely for legal
questions that frequently come up in lower courts and, for any given case dealing with the
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illustrate, imagine the Court is preparing an opinion on a particular matter. The
Court believes the rule it will announce in the case is the best one but it is not
certain. In a world with no horizontal stare decisis, the Court could write a clear
rule and know that, if it turns out to be wrong, it could easily overturn the rule
the next time the issue comes before the Court. But with some form of
horizontal stare decisis, the Court knows that any rule it writes will be harder to
overturn because it will be presumptively correct. 172 If the Court gets the rule
wrong, it might end up binding itself to a less than ideal rule in future cases. 173
However, if the Court writes a vague rule, the Court can more easily claim to
follow the precedent, while interpreting the vagueness in such a way as to make
the application of the rule less problematic. A vague rule makes it easier for the
Court to confine the vague precedent to its facts and to update the rule to meet
changing circumstances without expressly overruling the precedent.174
These vague rules come with costs, namely that they provide less than
optimal notice about the content of the law for concerned parties. For example,
consider the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the scope of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause.175 The Court has established that an act of
Congress is constitutional under the Commerce Clause if it has a "substantial
relation to interstate commerce."1 76 The vagueness of the phrase "substantial
relation" gives the Court leeway to find violations of the Clause or not under a
variety of facts without having to overturn the doctrinal test. It also provides
less than clear notice to Congress about when its legislation is in danger of
crossing the line and becoming unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
Despite this cost, horizontal stare decisis persists in large part because many
believe it advances other rule-of-law values. The Supreme Court often offers
platitudes about how the "rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the
doctrine of stare decisis,"l77 and legal scholars have backed up these statements
question, there is a low probability of review. By contrast, high courts are more likely to
produce vague rules for legal issues that arise less frequently and are more likely to be
reviewed by the high court. Under these conditions, the high court does not need to worry
about constraining the lower court ex ante with a broad rule. Instead, the court must worry
more about constraining its own options by having to adhere to a clear, somewhat binding
precedent.
172 This point assumes that the Court is bound not just to its precedent on the issue at bar
but also to the precedent establishing stare decisis as binding. For a brief discussion on the
legal philosophy behind such judicial self-binding, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme
Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of
Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 189-90 (2006).
173 But see Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 143-44 (2000)
(noting that a weakened stare decisis rule that allows judges to overrule results may produce
worse outcomes becomes judges may not have the capacity to accurately determine when
precedent is erroneous or obsolete).
174 See Solum, supra note 172, at 191-92.
175 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
176 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
177 Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1987).
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with substantive defenses of stare decisis. For example, Professor Jeremy
Waldron has recently shown that stare decisis is justified by specific rule-of-law
norms, including: the principle of generality, which "requires all judges to base
their decisions on general norms and not just leave them as freestanding
particulars"; institutional responsibility, which requires judges to treat precedent
"as a genuine legal norm to which the court that he belongs to has already
committed itself"; and the principle of fidelity to law, which "requires the
precedent judge to approach her decision as far as she can by trying to figure
out the implicit bearing of such existing law as there is on the case in front of
her." 78
Ultimately, both vertical and horizontal forms of stare decisis are a
mainstay of our constitutional system. 179 Because of the benefits of stare
decisis, jurists over time have chosen adherence to stare decisis over adherence
to an anti-self-interpretation norm. 180
2. Judicial Self-interpretation Through Federal Common Law
Federal common law is another context in which the Supreme Court makes
and self-interprets law. Scholars and jurists have labored to provide a precise
definition of federal common law. For our purposes, it is enough to say that
federal common law refers to judge-made rules that are not derived from
statutory or express constitutional text and have the status of federal law.181 For
centuries, there has been a debate about the scope of federal courts' common
law power, but the conventional view, and the one embraced by the Supreme
Court, is that our constitutional structure left some category of legal questions
178 Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1, 23, 31 (2012).
179 Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 748 (1988) (stare decisis has become "part of our understanding of what law is").
180 In a footnote, Manning dismisses judicial stare decisis as irrelevant to the question of
agency self-interpretation because "any legal system that includes both an ultimate expositor
of legal meaning and a doctrine of stare decisis will inevitably involve some self-
interpretation; at some point, a final judicial authority will have to determine what its
precedents mean." Manning, supra note 4, at 648 n.175. The problem with this argument is
that stare decisis is not a necessary feature of a constitutional system. Constitutional
designers could have created a system without stare decisis and thus minimized judicial self-
interpretation. The fact that our system possesses a more robust version of stare decisis
suggests that the abhorrence of self-interpretation is a comparatively weak constitutional
value compared to the rule of law values that underlie stare decisis.
18 1 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1985). Some have suggested that the distinction between statutory interpretation
and common law is one of degree but not kind. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 332
(1980) ("The more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative policy, the more likely a
court will describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less precise and less explicit
the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of common law.").
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governed by federal common law. 182 Within this category of cases, judicial self-
interpretation is inevitable because, after a court establishes new law through
common law it must interpret that law in individual cases. For example,
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.' 8 3 involved a water
dispute between two states. The Supreme Court declared that the interstate issue
was not governed by either state's laws but by federal common law.184 The
Court then looked to its precedent to find the federal common law rule, which it
determined was a rule of "equitable apportionment" between states.185 It then
interpreted that rule by applying it to the dispute at bar.186
The risk of such self-interpretation is that the Court, in order to retain
flexibility, will craft vague common law that provides less than optimal notice.
But federal common law has its benefits. The most commonly invoked rationale
for federal common law is that there are often shortcomings or biases in states'
law-making processes that create a need for federal law. The federal political
branches have not always provided the needed federal law.187 When there is a
gap of this sort, federal courts must create federal law on their own. For
example, in matters dealing with border disputes among states, individual states
are likely to produce laws biased in their own favor, thus generating a need for
federal law to provide a fairer rule. When Congress has not established a federal
rule, the Supreme Court may have to develop the rule itself, as in the
Hinderlider case noted above. A similar rationale has been invoked to justify
the use of federal common law in foreign affairs.188 The logic is that foreign
affairs typically require a uniform approach that multiple states cannot provide.
Sometimes the federal political branches will have failed to provide the
necessary law, leaving the federal courts to develop the law on their own unless
and until the political branches act.
While some have denied the legitimacy of federal common law entirely, 189
it has long remained a feature of our constitutional system. Despite involving
self-interpretation, it persists because of its value in promoting federal
uniformity.
182 See Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal Common Law, 99 HARv.
L. REv. 881, 907-08 (1986); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1513,
1513-17 (1984); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 1003, 1007 (1985).




187 See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw.
U. L. REv. 585, 588 (2006).
188See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1620-21 (1997) (describing and attacking this conventional view).
189 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 766-67
(1989).
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3. Judicial Self-interpretation Through Rules of Governance
The first session of Congress in 1789 produced a statute authorizing courts
to "make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business
in the said courts."1 90 Since that time, judicially crafted rules for court business
have become a mainstay of our constitutional structure. Most prominently, the
Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for court
business.191 These statutes inevitably lead to judicial self-interpretation because
the Supreme Court establishes rules of conduct and then later interprets those
rules to ensure that court actors abide by them.
As with many instances of self-interpretation, the Supreme Court can use its
self-interpretation power to enact vague rules that produce less than optimal
notice to litigants, knowing that it can expound on these rules through later
interpretations. Consider the standard for surviving a motion to dismiss. The
Supreme Court promulgated a vague rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), which provides that complaints can be dismissed for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted."l 92 The rule, by itself, provides little
guidance to litigants about how much work they need to put into their
complaints in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Instead, guidance has come
through Court interpretations of the rule, which can significantly alter litigants'
expectations. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court interpreted the rule to
require pleading "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." 93 This interpretation was widely seen as an attempt by the Court to make
it harder for parties to survive a motion to dismiss in many cases.194
While judicial self-interpretation of court rules has its costs, there are a
couple of reasons why the Supreme Court has the power to both write and
interpret these rules. First, there are definite benefits to having judges, who are
experts in the internal affairs of courts, establish rules for court business.195 If
legislators set these rules, there would be a greater risk of error due to a lack of
specialized information. Second, judicial self-interpretation is necessary to
preserve judicial autonomy. If legislators set the rules for how to behave in
federal court, it could be seen as legislative interference with another branch's
internal affairs. Taken together, these benefits plausibly outweigh the costs of
judicial self-interpretation here, and once again self-interpretation persists in our
constitutional system.196
190 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
19128 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
192 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
193 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
194 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2010).
195 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1186-87 (1996).
196 One could argue that governance rules produced by courts are of an entirely different
ilk than legislative rules and legislative-like rules produced by agencies and should not be
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4. Procedural and Structural Checks on Judicial Self-Interpretation
Along with the institutional advantages that support and maintain
widespread judicial self-interpretation in different contexts, the practice of
judicial self-interpretation also persists in part because its risks are minimized
by several procedural and structural constraints that make judicial self-
interpretation less worrisome than self-interpretation by the heads of the other
branches of government.
First, Justices' ability to set their own agendas is significantly constrained.
Congress can freely set its policy agenda, and Presidents too have substantial
leeway to prioritize among a variety of issues. But Supreme Court Justices must
wait for cases on the issues they want to address,197 and the Court is often left
out of some of the most pressing issues of the day.198 As a result, power-
maximizing judges can often do less harm than power-maximizing legislators or
Presidents can. Thus, granting self-interpretation powers to judges is less
problematic.
Second, Justices have a weak information-gathering capacity compared to
Congress and the President. While Congress and the President can draw on
reams of information prepared by experts largely of their choosing, courts must
generally rely on information presented to them by the litigants at bar.199 The
courts have limited ability to supplement this information with their own
information-gathering efforts. This constraint can deter judges from writing
opinions that require additional information gathering of their own. As a result,
courts are deterred from departing too much from the holdings and rulings
suggested to them in briefs and other litigation materials. Courts' comparatively
constrained information-gathering capacity thus reduces their ability to abuse
self-interpretation powers by crafting rules and interpretations of rules as they
see fit, if such rules and interpretations have not been briefed and supported by
litigants.
considered in this debate over agency self-interpretation. After all, these governance rules
only apply to those appearing before or filing documents with the courts. However, it is
difficult to distinguish judicial governance rules from agency rules in a meaningful way.
Judicial rules for the governance of court proceedings are parallel to agency rules covering
entities under the agency's jurisdiction because both rules "have the force of law on those
subject to them and those administering them." Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 576
n.13 (1984). The Supreme Court can fine attorneys and hold court actors in contempt by
interpreting its rules of procedure. Viewed this way, there is little distinction between
judicial self-interpretation and agency self-interpretation because both the judges and
agencies are interpreting rules that sanction behavior under their purview.
197 See Baird & Jacobi, supra note 10, at 216.
198 See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's
Agenda-And the Nation's, 120 HARv. L. REV. 4, 8-9 (2006).




Finally, the constitutional separation of powers provides an indirect check
on judicial self-interpretation. Federalist No. 78 famously observed that the
judicial branch was the weakest of the three branches. 200 It must rely on
Congress for funding and most of its jurisdiction,201 and it must depend on the
executive to enforce its judgments. 202 This weakness can make judges reluctant
to issue opinions that would provoke a backlash from the political branches of
government. 203 The fear of political backlash can constrain the Court and its use
of self-interpretation powers. 204 For example, because of potential backlash, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to expand its federal common law power, and the
self-interpretation power that goes along with it, into domains already regulated
by Congress or the President.
Overall, the judicial structure is quite permissive when it comes to self-
interpretation. Judicial self-interpretation is so widespread because of various
institutional advantages and procedural and structural institutions that minimize
the risks of giving judges this power.
IV. TRADEOFFS AND PROCEDURES THAT JUSTIFY AGENCY SELF-
INTERPRETATION
This Article has shown that self-interpretation is common in our
constitutional system. It exists when the institutional benefits from a structural
scheme that includes self-interpretation plausibly outweigh the costs from self-
interpretation. Sometimes, procedural and structural protections also mitigate
the risks from self-interpretation and help justify the existence of this power.
These findings suggest that there is no universal anti-self-interpretation norm
that counsels in favor of overturning Seminole Rock. With no clear presumption
against the doctrine, the question becomes whether Seminole Rock deference is
vulnerable because its costs are high and its benefits too low. This Part makes
two straightforward points that cut in favor of retaining Seminole Rock. First,
challengers to the doctrine have not shown that the costs of agency self-
interpretation justify departing from the decades-old status quo. Second, the
risks of vague draftsmanship under the status quo are far less than assumed
because agencies' ability to promulgate vague rules is already checked by
procedures established by Congress and the President, namely notice-and-
comment rulemaking and White House review of agency rules. These
procedural mechanisms have been largely absent from the discussion on how
Seminole Rock promotes vagueness. Yet, they provide strong support for
200 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
201 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2164 (2004).202 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
203 See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1337, 1341-43 (2006).204 But see Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 42
(2005) ("There are political limits on what the Court can do, but they are capacious.").
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leaving the doctrine in place because a judicial check on agency vagueness may
be unnecessary given the effectiveness of these procedures.
A. Institutional Tradeoffs and Agency Self-Interpretation
Should agencies be allowed to issue controlling interpretations of their own
regulations? Agency self-interpretation can lead agencies to draft regulations
that are overly vague. On the other hand, the benefits of agency self-
interpretation are that agencies instead of judges interpret regulations, which
likely reduces errors because of judges' comparative lack of expertise,
accountability, and familiarity with the original intent of the regulation, as
discussed in Part II. These benefits plausibly outweigh the risks from agency
self-interpretation and justify continued adherence to Seminole Rock.
Of course, it is impossible to say with any significant degree of certainty
whether a highly deferential regime is more cost-effective than a regime in
which agency regulatory interpretations would receive little or no deference.
Knowing which regime is more cost-effective would require comparing public
welfare outcomes under the two regimes. We do not have this data because
Seminole Rock has been the law since 1945.205 Moreover, even if both types of
regimes existed (perhaps in different state governments), we would have no
way of quantifying these costs because one cannot simply capture the value of
accountability and expertise, and one cannot easily specify the optimal level of
rule vagueness and then measure deviations from that goal.
Despite this uncertainty, for seventy years, the Supreme Court has acted as
if the benefits from agency self-interpretation outweigh the costs. Assuming that
the burden is on the challengers to this well-entrenched status quo, 206 they
simply have not shown that the Supreme Court has been wrong all this time and
should overturn Seminole Rock now.
Challengers to Seminole Rock deference could potentially show that agency
self-interpretation is more problematic than presidential self-interpretation.
Presidents, because of their stature as the nationally elected figures atop the
executive hierarchy, have often been treated as different from agencies and
more worthy of respect. For example, Presidents do not have to comply with the
APA. The argument could be made that, because Presidents are special, the fact
that they have self-interpretation powers does not mean that agencies should
too. Similarly, it could be argued that, because the judiciary is weak compared
to the political branches of government, judicial self-interpretation is less
problematic than self-interpretation in those branches. Agencies, with their
205 Cf Vermeule, supra note 173, at 116 ("There is some chance that switching to a
presumption in favor of extraterritoriality will increase legislative drafting costs, but that
probability cannot be quantified, because no series of similar trials exists from which to
generate a frequency or a nonrandom subjective probability assignment.").
206 When making decisions under this kind of uncertainty, it is common to place the
burden on the challengers to the status quo. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation,
Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 698, 699 (1999).
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legislative-like rulemaking powers and ability to execute vast statutory powers,
are generally seen as belonging to the political branches. Thus, perhaps judicial
self-interpretation is less problematic than agency self-interpretation, and the
existence of the former should not justify the latter.
However, even if we accept the contestable assumptions that Presidents
deserve more leeway under administrative law than agencies do and that
judicial abuse of power is less of a concern than agency abuse of power, these
assumptions do not show that agency self-interpretation should not exist. The
basic point remains that the existence of self-interpretation depends on
institutional tradeoffs. Presidential self-interpretation may be acceptable
because Presidents have unique institutional advantages, but that simply proves
the point that there is no absolute norm against self-interpretation and that self-
interpretation is more likely to exist when the institutional advantages of such a
structure are greatest. Likewise, judicial self-interpretation may be acceptable
because courts are weak, but that just shows that self-interpretation is more
likely to exist when the risks from the use of a self-interpretation power are
lower.
The institutional benefits of agency self-interpretation may be less strong
than those for presidential self-interpretation, and the institutional costs of
agency self-interpretation may be greater than those for judicial self-
interpretation. But opponents of Seminole Rock deference have not shown that
agency self-interpretation is, on net, institutionally undesirable. The doctrine
has existed in its basic form for nearly seventy years, and we should not depart
from it now.
B. Procedural Protections Against Vague Agency Rules
Even if one is inclined to believe that vague rules of the sort encouraged by
agency self-interpretation generate huge costs that ought to be minimized, the
problem for challengers to Seminole Rock is that these costs are already
addressed by notice-and-comment rulemaking and presidential review of
agency rules. Empirically, there is no reason to believe that these more direct
procedures are insufficient to check agency self-interpretation or that a judicial
check would further improve outcomes. This Section first discusses how notice-
and-comment rulemaking decreases the amount of vagueness in agency rules. It
then discusses how presidential review also limits vague agency rules. It
concludes that the marginal benefits of scrapping Seminole Rock in order to
check agency vagueness may simply not be worth the costs, given the existing
institutions that reduce agency vagueness.
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1. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking as a Safeguard Against Vague
Agency Rules
Regulated entities have an enormous impact on agency decisions through
notice-and-comment procedures, and they use this influence to reduce
vagueness in proposed agency rules.
Recall that Congress, through the APA, requires that agencies publish
proposed rulemakings, solicit public comments for their proposals, and consider
these comments before promulgating a final rule.207 These notice-and-
comment procedures ensure that agencies' decisions are transparent and
responsive to interested parties.208 Regulated entities and their interest groups
tend to make the most use of comment periods, submitting voluminous
comments that often successfully lead agencies to alter proposals.209 If agencies
fail to respond to the comments, the groups can contact Congress and enlist
legislators in their effort to craft proposed rules to their liking. As a result of
their comments and lobbying, regulated entities have a significant and
documented effect on agency outputs.210
Not only do they have strong influence over agencies, regulated entities
have significant incentives to use their influence to minimize regulatory
vagueness. The clearer a rule, the more advanced notice these entities have
about what is expected of them and how they can comply. More importantly,
when regulations are clear and not vague, agencies lose flexibility to update the
rules through informal procedures. Instead, more updates must go through
comparatively onerous notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures again-thus
slowing and having a deregulatory effect on the regulatory process, which is
advantageous to regulated entities that want to avoid being subject to new
requirements.211
207 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
208 See Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 934 (2012)
(describing how notice-and-comment procedures can make opaque agency actions more
transparent).
209 One study looked at forty rules promulgated by four agencies from 1994 to 2001 and
found that business interests filed fifty-seven percent of the comments. Jason Webb Yackee
& Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on
the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POLITICS 128, 133 (2006).
2 10 See id. at 133-35; Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson, Lobbyists as
Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 11-12 (2010) (finding that single regulated entities are better able to employ and
monitor lobbyists who influence agency decisions than are diffuse interest groups).
211 A large body of literature has shown how notice-and-comment rulemaking delays
regulatory action in part because agencies take a long time to "write the lengthy preambles
and technical support documents and to address public comments on proposed rules."
Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992); see also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation
and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 70 (2000). Of course, regulated entities
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When regulated entities want to avoid vague rules, they often succeed in
their efforts to convince agencies to clarify proposed rules. For example, the
Department of Health and Human Services recently proposed a rule that would
implement portions of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). 212 Commentators
objected that the agency's definition of the term "medically frail" was too
vague, and the agency responded by clarifying the definition. 213 Similarly,
consider the Department of the Interior's recent proposed rule on hydraulic
fracturing of oil and gas, also known as fracking.214 The fracking industry
complained that the agency's early proposals were too vague, and the agency
"worked to ensure the revisions [to the rule] also increased clarity." 215
Examples like these, in which commentators successfully push an agency to
clarify a vague term, are commonplace. While it is impossible to know
precisely how much vagueness is eradicated through the notice-and-comment
process, it undoubtedly is significant.216
2. White House Review Reduces Vagueness in Agency Rules
White House review of agency proposals is another important check on
vagueness in agency rules. The White House's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews the most economically and politically
significant rules proposed by agencies to ensure that they are cost-effective and
align with presidential priorities.217 The White House has an incentive to use
OIRA review to curb rules that are overly vague because such vagueness is
unlikely to benefit the sitting President. If a President wants to advance and
solidify his regulatory agenda, he will demand clear rules. Vagueness and
ambiguity leave room for the agency to fill in the gaps later, at a time when the
agency is likely run by officials appointed by a subsequent President who often
will not share the earlier President's political affiliation and preferences.
Unsurprisingly then, OIRA officials have in fact reported that a key function of
may sometimes want vague rules because the vagueness can give them leeway compared to
a clear rule that dictates precisely how they should behave.
21278 Fed. Reg. 42,160 (July 15, 2013).
213Id. at 42,229.
214 78 Fed. Reg. 31,636 (May 24, 2013).2 15 Id. at 31,645.
2 16 See generally Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414 (2005) (reporting the results of an empirical study finding that
"agencies react to the notice and comment process by making changes in their proposed
rules").
2 17 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). Agencies must submit to
OIRA all "significant" regulations, which include those that have an annual effect on the
economy of over $100 million as well as those that "[r]aise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates [and] the President's priorities." Final Bulletin for Agency





OIRA review is to "negotiate issues and clarify terms" in agencies'
proposals. 218
Undoubtedly, OIRA review alone does not ensure that all agency
regulations align with presidential preferences. OIRA does not review all rules,
and it does not have the resources to ensure that each rule perfectly aligns with
the President's preferences. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that
White House oversight in general and OIRA in particular have gone a long way
to ensuring that agencies' regulatory decisions respond to presidential
preferences. 219 For example, President George W. Bush's former OIRA
administrator has explained how, under her watch, OIRA ensured that high-
priority agency rulemakings were complete before the President left office. 220
Administrations try to finalize rules before exiting the White House because
finalized rules become more entrenched and are far harder than proposed rules
for later Presidents to undo.221 This goal has led to the well-documented
phenomenon of midnight regulations, in which agencies quickly finalize rules
before a President's term expires and the new President and his agency heads
take over. 222 In this midnight regulation process, the agency officials are doing
the opposite of writing rules designed to maintain flexibility for the agency
later. Instead, they are acting to limit the agency's flexibility by entrenching
policies that are difficult for the agency to later reverse. They do so because,
although this kind of behavior does not boost the power of their own agencies, it
helps the sitting President.
If agencies are in fact responsive to the preferences of sitting Presidents, it
is predictable that agencies will not draft especially vague rules at time 1 in
order to maximize their interpretive flexibility at time 2. Instead, they will write
rules that advance the President's agenda as clearly as possible now and leave
2 18 Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1278 (2006).2 19 See William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence
over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 611, 611-15 (2002) (discussing the influence the
President exercises on administrative rulemaking through ex parte OIRA contacts with
agencies).
220 Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Activity in the Bush Administration at the Stroke of
Midnight, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS, July 2009, at 27, 27.
221 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 557, 560-61 (2003). Aside from rushing
to finalize rules, agencies can entrench rules by developing internal procedures that put in
place procedural hurdles that make it harder for later agency officials to reverse existing
rules. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859, 888
(2009).
222 See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REv. 947,
983-84 (2003); Peter D. Holmes, Paradise Postponed: Suspensions of Agency Rules, 65
N.C. L. REv. 645, 646 (1987); Thomas 0. McGarity, Jogging in Place: The Bush
Administration's Freshman Year Environmental Record, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,709, 10,715
(2002); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U.
L. REv. 471, 471-72, 473 n.8 (2011); Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1883, 1884-85 (2012).
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less room for later administrations to undo their work through later regulatory
interpretations.
Ultimately, Congress and the White House have established institutions that
provide a direct safeguard against vague agency rules. Overturning Seminole
Rock deference would enable courts to also help reduce vague rulemakings.
However, the marginal benefits of adding this extra check on agency vagueness
may not be worth the costs of abandoning a doctrine that promotes expertise,
accountability, and adherence to regulatory intent. If existing procedures are
insufficient, the White House could fairly easily intensify its regulatory review
process to screen out more instances of regulatory vagueness. The costs of
doing so would likely be less than the costs of abandoning Seminole Rock
deference. In short, withholding deference to agency regulatory interpretations
is likely an unnecessary and inefficient way to reduce agency vagueness.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the constitutional norms governing whether and
when a government body has the power to issue controlling interpretations of
legal texts that it drafted. Contrary to one view, the Article has shown that there
is no widespread norm against self-interpretation and thus there should be no
presumption against self-interpretation in constitutional and administrative law
inquiries. The immediate normative payoff of this finding is to show that the
Supreme Court would be wrong to overturn Seminole Rock deference. Briefs
will likely soon be filed urging the Court to overturn the doctrine on the
grounds that it violates a norm against self-interpretation, and the Court should
reject these arguments. Aside from firmly entering the debate over Seminole
Rock, this Article also brings new insight into the many areas of public law
where self-interpretation occurs, including presidential oversight of agencies
and judicial stare decisis.
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